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Common Password Blacklist Checker

Common Password Blacklist Checker. Type a password to instantly check it against this site's built-in common-password blocklist. If your secret is long but familiar, before you check your password pattern, know that predictable shapes lower strength even when the string is long.

Your values

Checked in your browser against a built-in list of the most common passwords. Nothing is sent anywhere.

Like a custom banned password list: a password that contains any of these terms (3+ characters, after normalization) is blocked.

Result

Your password is
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Matched entry
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Normalized password
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Match rule
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Password length (characters)
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  • No account, no logging
  • Open formulas explained below
  • Works offline once loaded

A common password blacklist checker compares what someone types against common passwords and bad passwords that attackers already know, using breach data from earlier leaks. Run before an account exists, it keeps the easy guesses out and makes your security measurably harder to break.

How a Common Password Blacklist Checker Works

Behind the form sits a simple idea: reject any password list entry the moment someone tries to use it. NIST guidelines tell services to screen new secrets during account creation and password resets, and the UK's NCSC backs the same approach. A password checker of this kind never judges style. It only asks whether a value is previously breached or otherwise known, which modern authentication advice prefers over arbitrary composition rules that frustrate users. Services also compare against compromised credentials seen in the wild. For privacy-minded teams, the browser keeps everything local if you check a keyboard walk, which limits vulnerabilities and encryption worries for each user.

What the password deny list blocks

Several password deny lists exist, and each rejects weak passwords such as a dictionary word with a digit tacked on, plus leaked passwords and compromised passwords dumped alongside stolen credentials. The database can hold millions of rows, with the most common entries ranked first. Blocking one entry protects every one of the accounts that would otherwise have carried it.

Where bad passwords come from

Entries come from public leaks and from open source collections such as SecLists, whose corpus runs to a million rows. In a Windows domain, Active Directory can enforce a password policy that rejects banned words, and exports from earlier leaks supply the raw breach data.

Checking Pwned Passwords Without Exposing Yours

The best-known public service is Have I Been Pwned (HIBP), whose search shows whether a value sits among breached passwords. Each match traces back to a real data breach, and the counts keep growing as new breaches are added.

Privacy through k-anonymity

The lookup relies on k-anonymity: your device computes a SHA-1 hash of the value, and only the first five characters of that hash leave the browser. The service returns every matching suffix, and the final comparison happens locally, so privacy holds. A local cache keeps repeat lookups quick.

API access and downloadable corpus

An API returns answers in milliseconds, and the whole corpus can be downloaded for offline use. Teams that care about online security often mirror the data and run lookups inside their own network, because an exposed external endpoint is a dependency they would rather not carry.

Why Attackers Try the Most Common Password First

Attackers and hackers rarely guess cleverly. A brute-force attack or a dictionary attack starts with words from a dictionary and the most common password choices because they pay off fastest. A single vulnerable login raises the risk for everything behind it.

Credential stuffing with reused passwords

In credential stuffing, a bot replays an email and password pair from one credential database against many sites. It works because of password reuse: reused passwords mean one leak unlocks several accounts. Left alone, password reuse habits turn a minor leak into a chain of takeovers, especially after big breaches.

Password spraying and brute force

With password spraying, an attacker tries one popular value across thousands of usernames, staying under lockout thresholds. With brute force, every guess targets a single account until something fits. Blocking known values takes away the first approach's best ammunition.

Number strings and keyboard walks

Predictable number strings, keyboard walks such as zaq12wsx, and letter-for-number substitutions like swapping a for @ appear in every cracking toolkit, and the NCSC's published rankings are full of them. Adding numbers to a base word buys almost nothing, since those password patterns are tested early.

Sizing a Bad Passwords Filter for a Rowing Club Sign-Up

Imani runs registration for a rowing club and wants to stop members picking common passwords, so she is building her own blocklist checker for the sign-up form instead of paying for a service. Her banned set holds 184,000 entries, and the question is how big the browser download can be. Her inputs, in order: 184,000 entries, then a target false-positive rate of 1%.

Bloom filter size formula for a password blacklist, showing 250,000 passwords at a 1% false-positive rate needing about 292.5 KB
The bloom filter formula applied to a 250,000-entry password blacklist.

Sizing the blocklist's filter uses m = −n × ln(p) ÷ (ln 2)², which gives 1,763,651 bits, or 215.3 KiB, with 7 hash functions (6.64 rounded up). She cross-checks by hand: 1.76 million bits across 184,000 entries is 9.6 bits per entry, which matches the textbook figure for 1%.

Sizing a Bad Passwords Filter for a Rowing Club Sign-Up
Target false-positive rateFilter sizeHash functions
1%215.3 KiB7
0.1%322.9 KiB10
0.01%430.6 KiB14

What stands out is how little the size moves: a tenfold drop in false positives costs only about 108 KiB more. At 1%, though, roughly 10,000 of every million good passphrases would be wrongly refused, and that is the number to watch, because a member told that a strong phrase is on the banned set simply gives up, while real breached picks stay blocked either way. She picks 0.1% and ships a 323 KiB file, which still sits under the size of a typical hero photo.

The edge case: a bloom filter can say "listed" wrongly but never "clean" wrongly. That makes it safe as a first gate, yet it cannot replace NIST SP 800-63B's rule of an 8-character minimum, so Imani keeps that length rule and adds the server-side repeat she already built.

Reading a Common Password List: Sample Rejections

Here is how a common password list treats typical picks, so you can see what gets turned away and why.

Sample screening results

Five made-up candidates run through a common password check against a ten-million-entry list produce these outcomes:

Sample screening results
CandidateLengthRule triggeredVerdict
Sunshine2024!13Dictionary word plus yearRejected
zaq12wsx8Matches keyboard walksRejected
mypassword9912Numbers appended to a common baseRejected
Marlin#447111Not listedAccepted, but short
harbor-quill-ninety-lamp23Not listedAccepted

Complexity alone does not rescue a listed value, while length does most of the work. A short entry can show a time to crack measured in seconds; the long phrase above needs centuries. Useful minimums for passwords are:

  • At least 12 characters on the accounts that matter most
  • A mix of uppercase and lowercase letters
  • A few symbols or other special characters

What a clean result does not prove

A "not found" answer says only that no matching entry exists. It is no verdict on password strength, and a fresh, unlisted value can still be guessable. Treat the result as one signal in wider cybersecurity and digital security practice, not as permission to relax.

Build Your Own Password Check for Account Registration

Developers can add the same screening to a registration page without a heavy backend, and a fast response improves the user experience because people learn at once that a pick is unusable.

Client-side validation with a bloom filter

Client-side validation ships a compact bloom filter of banned entries to the browser, which stores it in localStorage to avoid repeat downloads. Lookups take microseconds, and the false-positive rate is tunable.

Heatmap of bloom filter size in kilobytes for three password list sizes and three false-positive rates
Filter size grows with list size and tighter accuracy; the 250,000-password example is outlined.

Why server side screening still matters

Browser code can be bypassed, so the server side must repeat the test before saving anything. Treat the client script as a convenience layer for security, never as the gate itself.

Habits That Replace Weak Passwords Beyond a Blocklist

A blocklist stops bad picks, and habits do the rest. The NCSC recommends a passphrase of three random words, which beats a short string padded with symbols, and multifactor authentication (MFA) means a stolen secret alone cannot open the door.

Password manager and password generator use

A password manager stores unique values, and a password generator creates them, so nobody memorizes anything. Pair a password manager with the habits above and keep this page as a reference when you review them.

Protecting high-risk accounts first

Start with email and banking, since email controls resets everywhere else. Replace any reused value there first, screening each replacement against the blocklist before adopting it, then work down the rest of your accounts, guided by guidelines your own organization already follows.

Frequently Asked Questions

What's on this blocklist?
The same consolidated common-passwords list this site's other tools use -- widely known weak passwords, keyboard walks, and frequently breached values (things like "password123", "qwerty", "letmein"). See this site's own documentation for how that list was assembled and verified.
Why check against a blocklist instead of just scoring strength?
A blocklist check answers a different, more direct question: "has this exact value already been seen and blocked by real systems?" A password can theoretically score "strong" on length and character variety while still being a known compromised value -- blocklist checks catch that case specifically, which is why NIST SP 800-63B recommends screening against a blocklist as step one, before any complexity scoring.
My password isn't on the blocklist -- does that mean it's strong?
No -- a blocklist can only catch the specific values it contains, not every weak pattern. Passing this check just means your exact password isn't a known compromised entry; also run it through the Password Strength Checker or Password Pattern Analyzer for a fuller picture.
Does this check for near-matches, like "Password1!" vs "password"?
No -- this specific tool checks for an exact (case-insensitive) match only. Small variations of a common password can still be easy to guess in practice, since attackers routinely try common mutations (capitalization, appended digits, trailing symbols) of blocklisted values.
Is my password sent anywhere?
No. The entire check runs locally in your browser against data already loaded with the page -- nothing is transmitted to a server or stored.

About the author

Vinitha Pu

Founder and designer

Vinitha Pu is a graphic designer based in Palakkad, Kerala, who builds free, privacy-friendly browser tools. She studied Textile and Apparel Design at Avinashilingam University and completed a C-Tech in Graphic Design at Image Creative Education in 2025. She designs, builds and maintains the password generators, strength checkers, hash tools and security calculators on PasswordHive.

  • Content author: Vinitha Pu
  • Fact checked by: Vinitha Pu. Each tool's output is checked against official test vectors or a reference implementation, and every strength and crack-time figure against the formula it uses, before it goes live.
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